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Subsidiarity and the European

Community*
By George A. Bermann**
The notion of subsidiarity in European federalism labors from all
manner of burdens. It seems elusive by nature, commentators claiming that they do not know what subsidiarity means or, if they do, that
they do not see in it anything new. At the same time subsidiarity has
been presented at least in some quarters as a panacea for the Community's current malaise. It clearly is not that. Even if subsidiarity has
not been oversold, it is almost certainly overexposed, a condition that
the present Article is unlikely to cure.
My purpose in this Article is simply to help make some sense of
subsidiarity and even to make a case for it as a Community standard.
Thus, after offering a basic definition and rationale for subsidiarity
(Part I), I attempt to justify subsidiarity first by reference to the legal
and political circumstances that gave rise to it (Part II), and then by
reference to the specific functions it may usefully perform in the workings of the Community institutions (Part III). On the other hand, precisely because it does risk being oversold, subsidiarity's chief
difficulties need to be explored and understood (Part IV). This is not
because these difficulties are necessarily easily overcome, but because
their acknowledgment should help lower the expectations that continue to be brought to the subject.
I. THE MEANING OF SUBSIDIARITY
Subsidiarity stands for the proposition that action to accomplish a
legitimate government objective should in principle be taken at the
lowest level of government capable of effectively addressing the problem. Though originally an ecclesiastical precept,1 subsidiarity has
* This Article is based on a speech presented in March 1993 at the Hastings
International & Comparative Law Review's Eleventh Annual Symposium on International
Legal Practice, "The European Community in Evolution: Toward a Closer Political &
Economic Union."

** Professor of Law, Columbia University School of Law.
1. POPE Pius XI, QUA

Arsmto Argo, sec. 79 (1931).
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been seized upon as a principle of contemporary power-sharing between the institutions of the European Community and those of the
constituent Member States. More specifically, it posits that the Council of Ministers and, to the extent that they also enjoy decisional authority, the European Parliament and the Commission as well, should
exercise the power constitutionally vested in them by the Community
Treaties and by Community legislation only to the extent that the
Member States are unable, acting separately or in concert, to achieve
satisfactorily the same objectives.
Subsidiarity's affinity to federalism is clear. Like federalism, subsidiarity seeks to ensure that when political entities unite in order to
serve better their common ends (be they military, economic, or any
other), they nevertheless retain sufficient decisional authority on the
relevant subjects so that their subcommunities and populations enjoy
in substantial measure the benefits of localism. Not surprisingly, then,
proponents of subsidiarity tend to evoke an assortment of virtues similar to the ones that the architects of federalism in the U.S. and elsewhere have promoted. These virtues include self-determination (the
right of local communities to select the rules that they deem best for
governing their own affairs and their relations with others within the
community), flexibility (the opportunity to tailor rules to fit the special characteristics of the community and the facility to modify those
rules as local conditions and circumstances happen to change), preservation of local identities (a virtue difficult to define but to all appearances readily appreciated), and diversity (increasingly considered a
good in itself, but also traditionally favored as creating opportunities
for experimentation and progress). The impulse to safeguard these
values drives the rhetoric of subsidiarity much as it has elsewhere
driven the decisions to establish federal structures of government and
to devise for those systems specific mechanisms for maintaining a decent equilibrium in the exercise of power between the center and the
states.
This is not necessarily to equate subsidiarity with federalism. The
practical meaning of subsidiarity depends very much on the content
that one gives to the notion of achieving objectives "adequately," "satisfactorily," or "effectively" at the state as compared to the Community level. I explore in Part IV of this Article some of the ambiguities
lurking behind the subsidiarity formula, and I suggest what their resolution may mean, practically speaking, for subsidiarity as an analytic
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device. The task of situating subsidiarity in the theory of federalism is,
however, one that I take up fully in another article.'
H. THE LEGAL AND POLITICAL RATIONALE FOR
SUBSIDIARITY
In its brief, thirty-five year history, the European Community has
experienced a wide variety of political moods, and it has experienced
change in accordance with quite different rhythms. These moods and
rhythms are of course the subject of a rich political science literature.
It is fair to say, however, that by the mid-to-late 1980s, the Europeans
had an overwhelming sense of momentum in the Community's legal
and political integration; many believed it to be irreversible. This momentum can most visibly be traced to the Commission's 1985 White
Paper,3 which established an ambitious legislative program for completing the internal market ("the 1992 Program") on a scale that the
population could appreciate as never before. The White Paper was
followed shortly thereafter by adoption of the Single European Act4
which, apart from its other contributions, introduced important procedural changes that would facilitate adoption of the 1992 Program.
Prominent among these was the substitution in many areas of qualified majority voting for unanimous voting in the Council of Ministers.
The change clearly strengthened the Community's capacity to act over
the objections of a minority of states, and it permitted the institutions
to harmonize, on an unprecedented scale, fields of law long thought to
be reserved exclusively to the states. The theory was that divergences
in Member State rules, even on subjects within Member State jurisdiction and even as applied to strictly local transactions, might represent
barriers to interstate commerce and thus to the internal market and
that their reduction or elimination by law was a legitimate Community
enterprise.
The Single European Act also amended the Community Treaties
to bring new, essentially noneconomic matters into the Community's
legislative sphere, including environmental protection s and worker
2. George A. Bermann, Taking Subsidiaritv Seriously, 94 COLUM. L. Rtv. (forthcoming Mar. 1994).
3. Completing the Internal Market: White Paper from the Commission to the European Council, COM(85)310 final.
4. SwGLE EuRoPEAN Acr [SEA].
5. Id. tit. II, ch. H (adding art. 130r-t to Tim TREATY EsTABLstm;O THE EutROPEAN
ECONOMIC COiNSNITY [EEC TREATY]).
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health and safety. 6 In so doing, it also raised the prospects of yet further jurisdictional expansions, such as those that the Maastricht Treaty
would later introduce. The Act also formalized the Member States'
program of coordination of foreign policies. 7 The institutions in turn
gave every sign of legislating vigorously within the new fields of authority conferred upon them.
There is fairly clear evidence that subsidiarity is a response to
such widening in the Community's sphere of competence. Subsidiarity's first mention in the Community Treaties in fact came with
the Single European Act. There, the inclusion of a new jurisdictional
chapter on environmental protection was accompanied by a statement
that the Community was only to take action relating to the environment if "the objectives.., can be attained better at [the] Community
level than at the level of the individual Member States.", Later, the
1989 Delors Report, 9 which foreshadowed the creation of an eco-

nomic and monetary union, called by name for application of the subsidiarity principle. Economic and monetary union (including an
eventual central bank and single currency) was of course among the
Maastricht Treaty's most adventurous substantive chapters.
Rather than tag only its most controversial chapters with the subsidiarity label (as the Single European Act had done), the Maastricht
Treaty makes subsidiarity a general principle of Community law, and
one might even say of Community constitutional law. Thus, the new
article 3b, which the Maastricht Treaty specifically adds to the Teaty
Establishing the European Economic Community, provides that in areas of concurrent competence "the Community shall take action...
only if and in so far as the objectives of the proposed action cannot be
sufficiently achieved by the Member States and can therefore ... be

better achieved by the Community." 10
It should not be forgotten that, by this time, the Court of Justice
also had established through its case law a number of far-reaching
constitutional principles designed to secure the primacy and effectiveness of Community law in the national legal orders, and that the highest Member State judiciaries had largely accepted these principles.
These include notably the principles of supremacy, direct applicability,
6. Id. tit. II, ch. II (adding art. 118a, b to the EEC TREATY).

7. Id. tit. Ill.

8. EEC TREATY art. 130r(4).
9. BULL. EC 4-1989, points 1.1.1 to 1.1.5.
10. EEC TREATY art. 3b (as amended 1992). See also TREATY ON EUROPEAN UNION
[MAASTRICHT TREATY] art. G.
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and direct effect. As a consequence of these principles, each and
every new Community initiative, whether in the internal market arena
or in one of the Community's newer competences, stood to enjoy immediate recognition as supreme and, where possible, also directly effective law throughout Community territory.
Besides constructing a powerful federal structure based on the
supremacy, direct applicability, and direct effect of Community law,
the Court of Justice also developed a jurisprudence of interpretation
and a jurisprudence of remedies that further strengthened the Community's position vis-a-vis the Member States. This jurisprudence
may be summed up in terms of several different ideas. One such idea
was that the grant of legislative powers to the Community by the treaties should not be narrowly construed. This result was achieved in
part through expansive readings of the EEC Treaty's jurisdictional
language,11 in part by generous use of the implied powers clause,"- in
part by the Court's relative inattention to the notion of enumeration
of powers,' 3 and in part by a judicial doctrine of federal legislative
4
preemption.1
A second idea that the Court's jurisprudence conveyed, albeit
less directly, was that the political institutions of the Community were
free to legislate as fully as they chose within the outer limits of Community competence, provided they observed the procedural conditions set out in the Treaties themselves as well as certain very basic
and general unwritten principles-notably equality, proportionality,
and the protection of legitimate expectations. These general principles have played a vital role in judicial protection of the individual
against substantive unfairness on the part of the Community institutions,15 but did not seek directly to protect the Member States themselves from the Community's unwarranted intrusions on their
sovereignty.
Third, Court of Justice case law laid great emphasis on the requirement that the administrative and judicial branches of the Member States make fully adequate remedies available to private parties
11. See generally J.H.H. Weiler, The Transformation of Europe, 100 YALE L. 2403
(1991).
12. EEC TREATY art. 235. See generally GEORGE A. BEPrA" ET Ai., Cases and
Materials on European Community Law 31-36 (1993).
13. See generally Weiler, supra note 11.
14. See generallyMichel Waelbroeck, The Emergent Doctrineof Communi, Prcemption: Consent and Re-delegation, in 2 CouRTs AND FREE MAuRs 543 (T. Sandalow & E.
Stein eds., 1982).
15. See generally B F I et al., supra note 12, at 129-49.
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for vindicating the claims they derived from Community legislation.16
The states' essentially procedural obligation to enforce private claims
based on Community law is of course a reflection of both the
supremacy and direct effects ideas because it serves to ensure the primacy and efficacy of Community law in the national legal orders. But
the Court's jurisprudence of remedies also offered repeated reminders
that the Member States' transfer of legislative powers to the Community and the exercise of those powers by the Community's legislative
institutions is only the beginning of the story. Member State agencies
and courts are also bound on a continuing basis to ensure that Community legislation, once made, is given adequate effect. Overall, the
combination of treaty-based enlargements of Community competence
and the Court's various doctrinal assertions of federal authority produced an important shift in the equilibrium of power between the
states and the Community.
Finally, the transition I have described was, as I have already suggested, accompanied by a steady retreat from unanimous voting by
states in the Council of Ministers in favor of qualified majority voting.
Departure from the rule of unanimity in the legislative process of
course helped the Community to accomplish its legislative goals of the
mid-to-late eighties, notably the 1992 internal market program. But
from a dissident Member State's point of view, the loss of power to
block or weaken legislative proposals by the Commission represented
a significant political change. States might thus find themselves powerless to prevent the Community from adopting legislation to which
they were opposed. That legislation, which once enacted stood to be
given the fullest possible effect by the Court of Justice, covered everwidening fields of law, some of them quite controversial. During debate over the Maastricht Treaty, three subject areas acquired particular notoriety from this point of view: expansion of Community
competence over social policy, 17 further empowerment of the Community institutions in foreign and security policy,18 and, above all, the
ambitious blueprint for economic and monetary union. 19 The rocky
process of national ratification of the Maastricht Treaty-particularly
in Denmark, France, Ireland, and the U.K.-is testimony to the mis16. See, e.g., Case 33/76, Rewe-Zentralfinanz eG v. Landwirtschaftskammer fur das
Saarland, 1976 E.C.R. 1989, 1 C.M.L.R. 533 (1977).
17. MAAsTRicHT TREATY protocol 14 (Protocol on Social Policy).
18. Id. tit. V (Provisions on a Common Foreign and Security Policy).
19. Id. art. G (adding tit. VI to the EEC TREATY) and related protocols.
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givings with which this latest and greatest step in European legal and
political integration was greeted in some Member States.
Subsidiarity, clearly enough, was a doctrinal response to the
Community's new critics. Inscribing the principle in the revised EEC
Treaty itself seemed a suitably solemn way of affirming that the Community leaders were not about to efface the separate national identities composing the Community population. Although the drafters of
the Maastricht Treaty left in doubt the question of subsidiarity's justiciability, the European Council (consisting of the heads of state and
government) took up the matter at its December 1992 Edinburgh
Summit. It there opined that, while subsidiarity would not have direct
effect (in the sense of entitling private parties to invoke the principle
in support of their claims or defenses in national litigation), it would
form the basis for direct legal challenge of a Community measure in
the Court of Justice in a suit by a party having standing to sue in that
forum.20
Given the high legal and political stakes of the game into which it
was introduced, subsidiarity carried with it quite high, perhaps unrealistic expectations. Proponents hoped, in reliance on subsidiarity, to
apply the brakes to the Community engine sufficiently to preserve
some necessarily vague sense of localism without compromising the
institutions' political capacity and willingness to continue attending to
its essential tasks. A particular problem with subsidiarity, however, is
that it tends more to describe an abstract goal than a method of
achieving it. This perception could only strengthen the hand of those
who considered subsidiarity a politically weak and intellectually thin
defense against the European Community tide. Designed to help
solve a real problem, subsidiarity needed to be conceived of in real,
even operational, terms.
M.

SUBSIDIARITY AS A WORKING INSTRUMENT

Even though subsidiarity may, as noted, be judicially enforceable
in part, it plainly speaks first and foremost to the political institutions
of the Community. It bids them to take action to address a problem
of legitimate Community concern only if the Member States, acting
individually or collectively, are incapable of effectively addressing it
on their own. To that extent, subsidiarity expresses a policy of federal
legislative self-restraint. The evident assumption is that if the institu20. European Council, Conclusions of the Presidency, annex 1 to pt. A, at 4 (Dec. 1112, 1992) (on file with Hastings International and Comparative Law Review).
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tions refrain from acting except when they must, Member State and
local communities will be left with sufficient freedom of decision to
capture the values of localism.
As a political injunction, subsidiarity speaks to a wide variety of
actors. It addresses the Commission, one of whose principal tasks is
to draft and propose new Community legislation for eventual adoption by the Council of Ministers and, under co-decision, the European
Parliament. It addresses the Commission in its other functions as well,
namely (1) exercising decisional authority vested in it directly by the
Treaty of Rome, (2) exercising lawmaking authority delegated to it
from time to time by the Council, and (3) administering Community
law on a routine and daily basis as the Community executive. Subsidiarity likewise admonishes the Council of Ministers, faced with legislative proposals by the Commission, to confine the Community's
legislative interventions to cases where its objectives cannot otherwise
be met. To say that the Council should act legislatively with due regard for the states' own capacity to act is, of course, to say that these
states, which, after all, themselves compose the Council, should assess
their own capacity to act before acting in the Community's name.
Although the European Parliament has not figured heavily in discussions of subsidiarity, the principle can readily inform its actions as
well. In fact, subsidiarity should have special appeal to a body whose
very mission is to express the will of the peoples of Europe. Whether
in rendering purely advisory opinions, or participating in the Single
European Act's parliamentary cooperation procedure, or actually exercising legislative co-decision as provided for in many areas by the
Maastricht Treaty, the Parliament has in subsidiarity a yardstick for
gauging the wisdom of what is proposed. Conceivably, every advisory
body of the Community-the Economic and Social Committee, for
example-should have subsidiarity on its mind.
For all these bodies, subsidiarity implies a particular mode of legislative reasoning and analysis. It assumes an objective falling within
21
the outer limits of the Community's concurrent legislative authority.
Before advancing a Community measure to achieve this objectiveand, depending on the institution in question, advancing a measure
may once again mean proposing, commenting favorably on, assenting
to, or actually adopting it-the institution will presumably consider
21. If the objective falls within the Community's exclusive legislative authority, the
states have no constitutional right to act, even if they could do so more effectively than the
Community; if the objective falls outside the Community's legislative sphere, it is off limits
to the Community altogether, subsidiarity notwithstanding.
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and assess the states' capacity to achieve the objective through means
at their own disposal. If those means are in fact adequate, the measure contemplated by the Community should not be supported or
adopted.
While trying to understand subsidiarity's message as clearly as
possible, we should also recognize that it typically implies both a difficult factual inquiry and a delicate exercise in judgment. On the factual level, subsidiarity entails all the usual inquiries such as whether
there is a problem in fact to be addressed and whether the Community has the means to address it. It also entails a factual inquiry that
may easily escape consideration in the federal legislative process and
that it is precisely subsidiarity's mission to call to mind. The inquiry
concerns the capacity (legal, political, financial, technical, or otherwise) of state and local government to deal with the problem at hand.
This capacity will be difficult enough to establish, even before having
to discount the results to reflect the possibility that state and local
governments will not in fact use it, or not use it fully and effectively,
or that the performance of state and local government may be adequate in one or more Member States but less than adequate in others.
The speculative element, which is necessarily present in all political
analyses, is positively central to subsidiarity. Even after the facts are
in, so to speak, subsidiarity presents more than the usual measure of
political judgment: judgment about the efficacy of state action, judgment about the tolerability of a situation in which the states are relied
upon to act and fail to do so adequately, judgment about the costs to
Community objectives of variations in levels of performance from
state to state, and so on.
These operational aspects of subsidiarity received conspicuous attention from the European Council when it met at Edinburgh in December 19921 The heads of state and government who assembled on
that occasion, which happened to fall during the period of national
ratification of the Maastricht agreements, were aware that the European public needed reassurance and not just rhetoric about the future
of local self-government within the Community. A first operational
initiative by the European Council was to develop guidelines by which
institutional participants in the Community legislative process might
in the future determine whether a proposal before them comported or
failed to comport with the principle of subsidiarity and, on that ac22. European Council, supra note 20.
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count, deserved or did not deserve their support.23 I comment on the
specific value of these guidelines elsewhere. 24
Second, the European Council advised the Commission to consult with the Member States at an early stage in the formulation of
legislative proposals, specifically on "the subsidiarity aspects" of those
proposals.' The dialogue presumably would acquaint the Commission with the states' own views on the necessity for Community intervention and perhaps even with specific steps that the states might be
taking or thinking about taking, singly or in concert, to deal with the
subject matter before the Commission. It also called on the Commission to include in every legislative proposal that it might eventually
submit to the Council a reasoned statement of its conclusions on the
subsidiarity issue. 2 What the European Council was here envisaging
may be in the nature of what we would call, in the parlance of U.S.
regulatory practice, a "subsidiarity impact analysis."
Third, the European Council encouraged the Commission to take
a second look at all pending legislative proposals, and all proposals
still in the initial drafting stage, to see whether they pass muster under
subsidiarity. It also invited the Commission to take up the more
daunting task of re-examining all Community legislation already in
place-and presumably adopted without conscious reference to subsidiarity-to see if it comports with that principle.27 In fact the Commission had already partially conducted such a review, and the
European Council was therefore able to announce at Edinburgh the
Commission's withdrawal or modification of a certain number of still
pending proposals. The exercise doubtless reinforces the idea that
subsidiarity means something and that it counts.28
Fourth, the European Council directed a number of specific suggestions to the Council of Ministers. Besides the obvious admonitions, it called upon all of the Council of Ministers' working groups, as
well as the Committee of Permanent Representatives, to comment
specifically on the subsidiarity aspects of any proposal before them for
advice. 29 The European Council also recommended that the Council
of Ministers make a separate inquiry and take a separate vote on the
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.

Id. at 7.
Bermann, supra note 2.
European Council, supra note 20, at 10.
Id.
Id. at 4.
Id. annex 2 to pt. A, at 1-2.
Id. annex 1 to pt. A, at 12.
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subsidiarity aspects of any measure up for adoption (that is, separate
from the inquiry and vote on the merits of the measure), but that the
decision on both aspects be taken on the same occasion?0
There remains to be discussed the role that the Court of Justice
and the court of first instance should play in enforcement of the subsidiarity principle. Let us take first the situation in which the Community institutions adopt a measure despite doubts over the measure's
compliance with subsidiarity. One possibility in these situations
would be for the court to enforce subsidiarity rigorously as a procedural principle. By this I mean that the court might readily, in a direct
legal challenge to a Community measure, review whether the Council
of Ministers at least (and the Parliament where it also has a decisive
legislative voice) made a serious inquiry into the measure's conformity
with subsidiarity. (An earlier section of this Article detailed what
such an inquiry might entail.) This would resemble the "hard look"
that some have urged U.S. courts to take in reviewing administrative
action.3 ' On the other hand, it seems highly unlikely that the Council
will ever fail utterly to conduct a subsidiarity analysis or that it will
conduct and present one in such a way as to cause the court to consider it a sham.
That would leave the Court of Justice with only the possibility of
reviewing substantively the judgment that the challenged Community
measure satisfies the requirements of subsidiarity. Given the profoundly discretionary character of this judgment-which once again
entails at a minimum measuring the "adequacy" of state action, assessing the likelihood of such action across the states, and comparing
its efficacy with that of the proposed Community measure-the Court
will almost invariably consider it deserving of an extremely high level
of deference.
In the event the Community institutions decline to adopt a measure, out of consideration for subsidiarity, the opportunities for judicial review are even slimmer. Although the Community system
provides a judicial remedy for the institutions' failure to act, - z that
remedy presupposes a duty to act, and in the case of legislative measures the element of duty is almost always absent. Even if it were not,
the institutions' exercise of discretion to refrain from acting in the belief that the states are perfectly capable of doing so effectively will
30. Id. at 11.
31. See generally STEHEN G. BEaYE & RicHARD B. STEwART, Administrative Law

and Regulatory Policy: Problems, Text, and Cases 363-93 (3d ed. 1992).
32. EEC TREATY art. 175.
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certainly receive no less deference, and probably more deference,
than their exercise of discretion to intervene. On the other hand,
while there is thus virtually no prospect that the courts will review the
institutions' decision not to legislate, the political operation of subsidiarity as I have described it above offers some hope that the institutions will be able to correct on their own the errors they make in this
direction. A decent subsidiarity analysis by the political branches
should leave a fairly clear record of the elements of fact and judgment
upon the basis of which they decided not to act. This record may become the yardstick for determining whether the states in fact eventually acted effectively to address the problem at hand, and it may
contain a recipe for federal action on a deferred basis should such
action prove to be necessary.
Despite the practical limitations of judicial review, it is highly desirable that subsidiarity be considered a justiciable principle. Justiciability should promote subsidiarity's being taken seriously by the
political branches. It will also enable the Court to intervene in the
truly exceptional case in which those branches in fact egregiously ignore subsidiarity as a procedural or substantive mandate. Overall,
however, judicial review cannot be heavily counted on as the mechanism for making subsidiarity work. We thus return to the hope that
the political institutions will in fact genuinely ask the questions that
subsidiarity raises and that they will genuinely act in the legislative
process upon the conclusions to which their inquiries and analyses
lead them.
IV.

THE LIMITS OF SUBSIDIARITY

Defining, justifying, and operationalizing subsidiarity are all necessary if the principle is to be taken at all seriously by the Community
at the present juncture. These measures will not, however, necessarily
suffice to dispel the doubts surrounding the notion. Subsidiarity itself
has significant limitations as a principle of legislation for a federal
state. Subsidiarity's most severe limitations stem from its neglect of
other legitimate factors of legislative judgment. Those factors may be,
like subsidiarity itself, peculiar to systems based on power-sharing and
may help shape such systems' overall federalism balance. Other factors may be of the sort that all political systems, federal and non-federal alike, ought to take seriously. In this section I describe only
briefly what seem to me the prime examples of these shortcomings on
subsidiarity's part. I develop them much more fully elsewhere.
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Subsidiarity and the Internal Market

As previous sections have shown, subsidiarity presupposes the
existence of a regulatory objective over which both the Community
and the Member States have a claim to competence. Subsidiarity then
guides the institutions in determining whether Community intervention is needed in order to satisfactorily achieve that objective. The
newer Community competences-environmental policy, occupational
safety and health, consumer protection, economic and monetary policy, to name the more prominent-are ones in which it is relatively
easy to imagine the institutions asking subsidiarity questions and acting (to the extent they can tell) as subsidiarity suggests.
Ironically, subsidiarity cannot possibly work this smoothly when
the institutions pursue the Community's original and core purpose
which was, and probably still is, construction of an internal market in
which persons, goods, services, and capital move freely across Member State borders. 3 In legislating aspects of the common market-for
example, in harmonizing Member State rules on the packaging of
goods or the licensing of professions-the Community's central purpose is not so much the adoption of a specific policy as the creation of
an orderly and consistent regulatory environment. If the Community
were seeking to maximize the orderliness and consistency of the internal market, it would impose uniform standards and rules.
More often though, especially under its "new approach to harmonization," 34 the Community only pursues agreement on the essential
regulatory requirements and, instead of demanding uniformity on the
part of the states, tends to prefer the mutual recognition of different
national standards provided they meet those essentials. The point is
that the principal legislative questions to be decided in constructing
the internal market-whether the rules on a given subject need to be
harmonized, to what extent uniformity in those rules is desirable, how
much national variation to accept and on what issues, and what the
content of the harmonized Community standards themselves should
be-are not ones to which subsidiarity, at least as defined up to now,
is very responsive. They cannot be answered meaningfully in terms of
the states' capacity to deal adequately with a regulatory problem because the regulatory problem is not itself the issue. The issue is
whether and to what extent the Community's unquestioned interest in
creating and improving the common market justifies restricting the
33. Id. arts. 2, 3(a)-(c).
34. Council Resolution of May 7, 1985, 1985 OJ. (C 136) 1.

Hastings Int'l & Comp. L. Rev.

[Vol. 17:97

states' otherwise unfettered right to regulate whatever regulatory
problem is at hand.
Judgments about the need for and content of internal market legislation thus turn essentially on whether the gains in the functioning of
the common market produced by such legislation are sufficient to justify the resulting curtailment of the policymaking freedom of the
states to act in areas basically within their jurisdiction. The analysis,
not coincidentally, is very much like the analysis one might expect
Congress to make before deciding to use its Interstate Commerce
Clause powers to regulate, in the interest of unburdening interstate
commerce, a subject otherwise within the legislative competence of
the states.
It is consequently unrealistic to expect that the Council or Commission will find subsidiarity to be much help in determining whether
the burdens on interstate commerce flowing from the states' separate
regulation of an issue justify the enactment of legislation on that issue
at the Community level. Market uniformity is simply not a value that
subsidiarity is capable of measuring. Community policymakers will
have to approach issues of that sort with a quite different set of analytic tools, and it is to be hoped that subsidiarity will not get in the
way.
B. Subsidiarity and other Principles of Legislative Judgment
The preceding section shows that, even if we limit our inquiry to
federal systems, the standards for judging the proper scope of federal
legislative action may well differ according to how we frame the federalism issue. Subsidiarity states a perfectly intelligible principle for allocating responsibilities between the federal government and the
states in the regulation of a subject matter within their concurrent
competence. It does not, however, aid us significantly in determining
when the states' freedom to regulate a subject matter within their
competence should be curtailed in the interest of unburdening interstate commerce.
Subsidiarity's limitations become all the more apparent when we
consider that the choice between regulating at the federal or the state
level may also properly be influenced by considerations that have
nothing much to do with federalism at all, but that properly guide legislative judgment in all systems whether federal in structure or not.
Legislatures can consult a variety of principles of legislative judgment
in determining whether and in what form to intervene. "Proportionality" is the example of a legislative yardstick that comes most readily to
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mind because of its prominence both in Court of Justice jurisprudence
and in academic literature on the Community generally.
The doctrine of proportionality basically requires that government measures 1) bear a reasonable relation to a legitimate governmental purpose, 2) produce benefits that outweigh the corresponding
costs, and most important for our purposes, 3) represent the least burdensome or intrusive alternative among the various governmental
means that are available.35 Necessarily general in formulation, proportionality nevertheless expresses the most widely accepted set of
guidelines in Europe for the exercise of legislative discretion and for
the conduct of judicial review of those exercises of legislative discretion that are made. The doctrine seeks in essence to guarantee that
government acts rationally in a plurality of ways.
When we hold subsidiarity and proportionality up to the light together, we see how easily pursuit of the one may actually foil attainment of the other. For example, it might be the case that the purposes
for which a federal-level measure is contemplated could also adequately be served by a measure taken at the state or local level.
Under these circumstances, the doctrine of subsidiarity would ordinarily point to state or local, and not to federal, action. We may safely
assume that, in bowing to subsidiarity, federal authorities would also
be heeding the first two requirements of proportionality; unless the
state or local measure is rationally related to the purpose to be served,
and unless its benefits outweigh its costs, the measure can hardly be
described as "adequate" within the meaning of the subsidiarity doctrine. But the third requirement of proportionality is more difficult to
meet for the simple reason that the state or local measure may simply
not be the least drastic means available for achieving the stated purpose; the federal measure, which subsidiarity normally prefers, may
have that particular advantage in its favor.
In other words, the doctrines of subsidiarity and proportionality,
taken in their ordinary senses, may easily operate at cross-purposes in
the same case. It is of course possible to escape the tension by refusing to consider a state measure as "adequate" for subsidiarity's purposes unless it is also the least drastic means available, in accordance
with proportionality's final demand. But this would amount to overloading the term "adequate" within the meaning of the subsidiarity
principle and, in the process, severely weakening subsidiarity as an
instrument of localism.
35. See generally BERPNu.N et al., supra note 12, at 129-33.
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It is not my goal here to navigate a path between subsidiarity and
proportionality that will satisfy them both. That is a topic for another
day.3 6 But it is my view that, if subsidiarity is allowed to accomplish
too fully its relatively narrow purpose of confining Community legislation to matters that the Member States cannot themselves adequately
treat, it may leave insufficient scope for other principles of allocation
of power between the Community and the states that are equally valid
and no less important.
V.

CONCLUSION

Subsidiarity is a rhetorically important instrument of federalism
in today's European Community. It also conveys a set of messages to
the institutions that may help them avoid legislating on occasions
when the Member States could do as effective a job of accomplishing
the Community's policy goals. It is all the more important that the
political branches themselves practice subsidiarity since, although subsidiarity is now widely assumed to be a justiciable principle, the Court
of Justice and court of first instance will probably seldom find themselves in a position to enforce it.
Subsidiarity's chief weakness is perhaps its own content. As a
general matter, it addresses the problem of federalism as if the latter
required no more than keeping federal intervention to an absolute
minimum. However, even within the Community's own legal tradition, not to mention other federalism traditions, we encounter competing principles that on occasion will dictate different results. I cite
in this Article the Community's commitment to an integrated internal
market and the Court's doctrine of proportionality as criteria that may
point in different power-allocating directions than subsidiarity would
if it alone were taken into consideration. This suggests that maintaining the proper balance between Community and Member State governance for all occasions is a bigger and more important task than any
single criterion, including subsidiarity, can itself perform.
36. See Bermann, supra note 2.

